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COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR AUTHORITY
TO ISSUE WARRANTS
Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345 (1972)
Appellant was arrested for impaired driving on a warrant issued by
the clerk' of a municipal court. He moved to quash the warrant on the
ground that it was issued by a "non-judicial" officer in violation of the
fourth amendment. The trial court denied the motion and the Supreme
Court of Florida affirmed.2  The United States Supreme Court noted
probable jurisdiction. 3  Held: the clerk of a municipal court qualifies4
within the requirements of the fourth amendment to issue arrest war-
rants, for violations of municipal ordinances.
1. The duties of the clerk of the municipal court of Tampa, Florida, are to re-
ceive traffic fines, prepare the court's dockets and records, fill out commitment papers
and perform other routine clerical tasks. No law degree or special training is required
for the job. Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 347 (1972).
2. Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 250 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1971).
3. Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 404 U.S. 1014 (1972).
4. For similar holdings by state courts, see Commonwealth v. Penta, 352 Mass.
271, 225 N.E.2d 58 (1967); State v. Ruotolo, 52 N.J. 508, 247 A.2d 1 (1968). But see
Caulk v. Municipal Court, 243 A.2d 707 (Del. 1968) (holding that warrant issuing
authority is clearly a judicial function which cannot be delegated); State v. Paulich,
277 Minn. 140, 151 N.W.2d 591 (1967) (holding that a clerk not trained in law is
not qualified to determine whether complaints and warrants meet constitutional
standards).
5. Although most arrests are accomplished without a warrant, the practice in
some jurisdictions is to issue a warrant if a subsequent decision is made to prosecute the
suspect. These "post-arrest" warrants serve primarily as charging documents. There
is no constitutional requirement for the issuance of post-arrest warrants when a sus-
pect is lawfully arrested without a warrant, and, as Professor Frank Miller has pointed
out, this practice has led to some confusion when the validity of a post-arrest warrant
is challenged. In 1965, for example, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that war-
rants could only be issued by a magistrate, not by a prosecutor, as authorized by Wis-
consin statutes. State ex rel. White v. Simpson, 28 Wis. 2d 590, 137 N.W.2d 391
(1965). The trial court judges in Wisconsin applied the rule to post-arrest as well
as pre-arrest warrants, "and indeed in some instances held rather protracted hearings
before issuing a post-arrest warrant." The matter was finally clarified in Pillsbury v.
State, 31 Wis. 2d 87, 142 N.W.2d 187 (1966), which held that no warrant need be
issued to charge a suspect validly arrested without one. Thus, although the case does
not authorize prosecutors to issue post-arrest warrants, it dispenses with the need
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The fourth amendment requires that no warrant shall issue without
probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and that the
person or place named in the warrant is involved in the crime. Though
there are circumstances in which a warrant is not required to make an
arrest or search," the Supreme Court has expressed a preference for
warrants. 7  If a warrant is sought the issuing authority must be some-
one independent of the arresting and investigating officials. 8 Officers
engaged in "the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime"
are not "neutral and detached" as compelled by the fourth amend-
ment,' and the Court recently invalidated a search warrant issued by
a state attorney general 0 although he was acting in his concurrent capa-
for them altogether. There seems to be no reason why other jurisdictions which
make use of the post-arrest warrant could not do likewise, but for those jurisdictions
which do continue to use the post-arrest warrant as a charging instrument, the "neu-
tral and detached" standards ought not to apply to the issuing officer. For a detailed
discussion of this problem, see F. MILLR, PROSEcUTIoN: THE DECISION TO CARGE A
SUSPECT WrTH A CRME 11-14 (1970).
6. There are many circumstances in which a search warrant is not required:
1) searches conducted with the consent of the person to be searched, see Mintz, Search
of Premises by Consent, 73 DICK. L. REv. 44 (1968); Wallenstein, Consent Searches,
4 CRim. L. BULL. 509 (1968); 2) search of an auto at time of stop where failure to
search would allow evidence to be destroyed or leave the jurisdiction, see Chambers V.
Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Carrol v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); 3)
searches where exigent circumstances such as time or danger to the investigating officer
make it impractical to obtain a search warrant, see Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294
(1967); 4) a search incident to a valid arrest, see Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.
752 (1969); Note, Searches of the Person Incident to Lmvful Arrest, 69 CoLum. L.
REv. 866 (1969); Note, Scope Limitations for Searches Incident to Arrest, 78 YA.E
L.. 433 (1969).
The Constitution does not require that an arrest warrant be obtained prior to arrest
even when it is practical to do so. As a matter of state law in most jurisdictions an
officer may arrest for a felony if there is reasonable grounds to believe that a felony
has been committed by the person to be arrested and for misdemeanors committed in
the presence of the officer. J. ISRAEL & W. LAFAvE, CRIMNAL PROCEDURE IN A
NUTSHELL 120-27 (1971).
7. See Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1969) (arrest warrants); United States v.
Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965) (search warrants).
8. See, e.g., Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968), which held that a sub-
poena duces tecum issued by a district attorney could not confer the authority of a
search warrant, and that even if it could, it would be invalid because not issued by a
neutral and detached magistrate. See also Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443
(1971), discussed in note 10 infra.
9. Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 486 (1958); Johnson v. United
States, 333 U.S. 10, 13 (1948).
10. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 450 (1971). The state attorney
general in this case was in charge of the investigation and was later to head the prose-
cution of a well-publicized murder. The Court said that allowing prosecutors and
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city as a justice of the peace.1
In Shadwick, the Court held that a warrant-issuing official must be
both "neutral and detached," and capable of determining probable
cause.12 The municipal court clerks in Shadwick possessed the requi-
site detachment, both because of their disassociation from the activities
of law enforcement and their position under the supervision of the judi-
cial branch. Appellant contended that the clerks were "non-judicial"
officers, that is, that they were civil servants who held office on appoint-
ment by an "executive officer."" The Court rejected this argument,
however, choosing to apply the "neutral and detached" standard with-
out regard to labels. 4
In finding the clerks capable of determining probable cause,1" the
Court pointed out that laymen, such as comprise grand juries, have long
been entrusted with the evaluation of complex factual data.16 Since
the clerk's authority' 7 extended only to the issuance of warrants for
violations of municipal ordinances, the Court concluded that, absent a
showing to the contrary, these probable cause determinations were not
too difficult a task for the clerk to accomplish. The Court expressly re-
jected any per se invalidation of a state or local warrant system on the
policemen to issue warrants could not guarantee an independent determination of prob-
able cause.
11. Id. at 451. The Court refused to be influenced by the attorney general's
status as a "magistrate" since he did not possess the requisite neutrality. Simi-
larly, in Shadwick, the Court pointed out that the terms "magistrate" and "judicial
officer" had been used interchangeably for purposes of the fourth amendment, but
that to "extract further significance from the above terminology would be both un-
necessary and futile." Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 350 (1972).
12. Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 350 (1972).
13. Brief for Appellant at 8, Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345 (1972).
14. See note 11 supra.
15. Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 351 (1972).
16. Id. at 352 n.10: "Some communities, such as those in rural or sparsely set-
tled areas, may have a shortage of available lawyers and judges and must entrust
responsibility for issuing warrants to other qualified persons. The Federal Magistrates
Act, for example, explicitly makes provisions for nonlawyers to be appointed in those
communities where members of the bar are not available. 28 U.S.C. § 631(b)(1)."
17. Laws of Fla., 1903, ch. 5363, § 17:
The Chief of Police, or any policeman of the City of Tampa may arrest
without a warrant, any person violating any of the ordinances of said city,
committed in the presence of such officer, and when knowledge of the viola-
tion of any ordinance of said city shall come to said chief of police or police-
man, not committed in his presence, he shall at once make affidavit, before
the judge or clerk of the municipal court, against the person charged with
such violation, whereupon said judge or clerk shall issue a warrant for the
arrest of such person.
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ground that the issuing officer is not a lawyer or a judge."8
There are still unanswered questions concerning the proper delega-
tion of warrant authority. Though clerks at other levels of the judiciary
clearly possess the requisite neutrality, their ability to determine wheth-
er probable cause exists for the requested arrest or search may be more
carefully scrutinized if a complex crime is involved,1 9 especially if a later
invalidation of the warrant would create more serious consequences
than it would have in Shadwick. Also, the Court expressly declined to
decide whether a state may vest warrant authority in someone entirely
outside the sphere of the judicial branch,2" leaving open the possible
use of persons independent of both law enforcement and the judiciary.
The Court has often stated a preference for judicial intervention in
the arrest and search process to assure a reliable finding of probable
cause and to protect the public from arbitrary and unlawful police in-
trusions.2' The majority of arrests, however, occur without a war-
rant,22 and even in those cases where a warrant is sought, the realities
of criminal justice administration often diverge from the formal law.
At least one empirical study shows that even where warrant authority is
by statute confined to magistrates, it is the prosecutor who alone makes
the effective warrant decision. 23  Often the issuing magistrate only cur-
sorily scans the warrant before signing it.24  This widely practiced
18. Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 352 (1972).
19. The Court in Shadwick stated that the clerks were capable of determining
whether there was probable cause to believe there was a violation of the "common
offenses covered by a municipal code. There has been no showing that this is too diffi-
cult a task for a clerk to accomplish." Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345,
351 (1972).
20. Id. at 352.
21. See, e.g., Whitley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 564 (1971); United States v. Ven-
tresca, 380 U.S. 102, 105-07 (1965); Wong Sun v. United States, 361 U.S. 471, 481-82
(1963); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 270 (1960); Giordenello v. United
States, 357 U.S. 480, 486 (1958).
22. Of 171,288 arrests made by New York Police in 1966, "only 366 were made
pursuant to an arrest warrant." THE AMERICAN LAW INsTrTUTE, A MODEL CODE
OF PEE-ARRAIGNMENT PRocEDURE xix & n.5 (Tent. Draft No. 3) (1970).
23. "But, regardless of who actually signed the warrant . . . it was in all cases
treated as a mere ministerial duty, with the real decision having been made in the
office of the prosecutor." W. LAFAvE, ARREST: Tim DEcisioN TO TAxE A SusPECr
INTo CusTODy 33 (1965); see Miller & Tiffany, Prosecutor Dominance of the Warrant
Decision: A Study of Current Practices, 1964 WAsH. U.L.Q. 1.
24. Miller & Tiffany, supra note 23, at 5: "At most the judge merely scans the
warrant before signing; frequently he signs without examining the contents at all.
Obviously whatever the reasons, it is clear that magistrates do not exercise any real
control over the issuance of warrants...."
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"rubber stamp" procedure has been condemned by the Court,2 5 but
time, pressure, uncertainty in borderline cases, and faith in the law en-
forcement officers2 6 often cause a judge or magistrate to rely on a sup-
pression hearing to resolve the issue of probable cause.2 7  Seen in this
light, Shadwick merely extends an already abdicated function to an-
other group of officers who cannot be expected to provide any more
rigorous scrutiny of warrant applications than the judges.2
25. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964): "Although the reviewing court will
pay substantial deference to judicial determinations of probable cause, the court must
still insist that the magistrate perform his 'neutral and detached' function and not
serve merely as a rubber stamp for the police." Id. at 111. Although the Court
did not mention it, Ocampo v. United States, 234 U.S. 91 (1913), upheld an arrest
warrant that was issued by a magistrate but founded upon a probable cause determina-
tion made by a municipal prosecutor. The Court in Ocampa stated that "the func-
tion of determining that probable cause exists . . . is only quasi-judicial, and not such
that, because of its nature, it must necessarily be confided to a strictly judicial officer
or tribunal." Id. at 100. The holding in Ocampo may be inconsistent with Coolidge
and Aguilar insofar as it tends to authorize prosecutorial warrant-issuing, but the lan-
guage quoted above lends support to the Shadwick decision. The Court has not yet
clarified the status of Ocampo.
26. W. LAFAvE, ARREST: THE DECIsION TO TANE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY 33-36
(1965): "The reason for the complete abdication of control was explained simply by
one judge: 'I have complete confidence in the police and the prosecutor's office."' No
instance was observed in which a judge refused to issue an arrest warrant. Id. at 34.
'Therefore, perhaps the principal guarantee afforded by the warrant requirement in cur-
rent practice is that it prevents the arrest of some minor offender who the prosecutor
feels ought not to be prosecuted." Id. at 36.
27. See L. TIFFANY, D. MCINTYRE, JR. & D. ROTENBERG, DETECTION OF CRIME
116-23 (1967). It is not unknown for the judge issuing the warrant to later rule
that no probable cause existed. Id. at 120.
28. The argument has been advanced that the prosecutor should be the person
authorized to issue warrants. See Silverglate, Book Review, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1748,
1750 (1971): "[B]ecause the prosecutor is the single party most interested in seeing
that the warrant is validly issued upon probable cause, a prosecutor, rather than a
.neutral magistrate' should issue search warrants. The policeman, who usually applies
for the warrant, is not only more interested in 'ferreting' than in convicting, but ordi-
narily is incapable of complying with the technical rules for setting out probable cause
in proper form. And the magistrate (often an assistant court clerk) is more often than
not a rubber stamp. The prosecutor, on the other hand, is the one faced with the task
of having to try cases on the basis of defective search warrants." Id. at 1750 n.7.
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